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Abstract
Machine learning (ML) models deployed in many safety- and business-critical sys-
tems are vulnerable to exploitation through adversarial examples. A large body of
academic research has thoroughly explored the causes of these blind spots, de-
veloped sophisticated algorithms for finding them, and proposed a few promising
defenses. A vast majority of these works, however, study standalone neural net-
work models. In this work, we build on our experience evaluating the security of
a machine learning software product deployed on a large scale to broaden the con-
versation to include a systems security view of these vulnerabilities. We describe
novel challenges to implementing systems security best practices in software with
ML components. In addition, we propose a list of short-term mitigation sugges-
tions that practitioners deployingmachine learning modules can use to secure their
systems. Finally, we outline directions for new research into machine learning at-
tacks and defenses that can serve to advance the state of ML systems security.
1 Introduction
Machine learning (ML) advances in the processing of visual, language, and other digital data signals
are being rapidly deployed in real-world systems that have critical societal and business significance.
As with any computer technology deployed at scale or in vital domains, ML systems face motivated
adversaries intent on causing undesired behaviors or violating security restrictions. Recent research
shows that so-called adversarial examples violate security properties of individual models due to
fundamental flaws in deep neural networks. Such adversarial inputs are concerning because they
allow adversaries to fully control the model outputs. This has spurred much research on this threat,
largely focused on standalone computer vision models and adversaries that are restricted to direct,
small modifications of the pixel inputs (so-called ℓp-bounded adversarial perturbations). Multiple cy-
cles of attack-defend iterations on such algorithmic approaches to securing and breaking individual
models have led to valuable insights for ML research.
However, algorithmic defenses have not substantially improved the security of ML systems in prac-
tice because the assumptions underlying these defenses are often violated in real-world deployments.
To achieve ML systems and applications that are secure against adversaries —critical to implement-
ing trustworthy and reliable AI— the adversarial ML research community must broaden the security
conversation beyond algorithmic defenses per se.
In this work, we present the lessons learned from a full-access exploration of deployed ML systems
with millions of users. This analysis was carried out by a team of researchers with expertise in AI
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safety and robustness, ML theory, large-scale systems reliability, and systems security. Based on
this experience, we believe that research on robust and secure AI must expand its focus to address
the real-world problems that present themselves in practice. While we do not believe those recom-
mendations are exhaustive, we believe they would benefit other researchers in pursuing more secure
ML systems. We organize our observations and recommendations along two axes.
Rethinking Adversarial ML Research Through the Lens of Systems Security First, we join a
growing chorus of academic work (Sharif et al. [2016], Athalye et al. [2017], Eykholt et al. [2018],
Gilmer et al. [2018]) in observing that adversarial examples of the kind most commonly studied in
the literature are not a significant concern for real-world deployments. Most relevant adversaries are
incapable of introducing small-magnitude modifications in model inputs, nor can they be restricted
to making only these modifications, as most published work assumes. Therefore, all known defenses,
broken or stable, do not provide guarantees against the attacks most likely to be mounted in deployed
systems.
Rather, the design of secure machine learning systems should be directly thought of as a systems
security question. Systems security—the study of how to secure the behavior of complex software
systems against malicious attacks—has developed a set of principles that are now commonly used
to build secure systems with some insecure components. When viewed from the lens of systems
security first principles, we see that many of the important technical questions drastically change.
In Section 3, we describe how this reframing leads us to consider issues including end-to-end ML
security, robust input modalities, and adaptive defenses.
Retooling Systems Security for Adversarial Machine Learning Second, while adversarial ma-
chine learning can learn much from systems security principles, we find that many current practices
are difficult to implement, or simply incompatible with state-of-the-art machine learning. For ex-
ample, even basic countermeasures such as checking for invalid inputs to a system and updating
software to patch security problems encounter significant challenges in the context of modern ML
methods.
The field of adversarial machine learning must resolve these issues. In some cases, this requires
retooling security practices to be relevant to AI-driven software; in others, our basic understanding
of machine learning must be advanced. In Section 4, we describe a number of ways in which current
practices for securing AI either fall short of or are at odds with well-established security principles.
We also discuss short-term mitigations to these issues and outline where fundamental advances in
research are needed to bridge the gap.
2 Background
A wide array of work has explored the security of machine learning algorithms over the past several
years. We can divide the research most relevant to this paper’s focus into two categories: attack and
defense research on individual models and high-level research seeking to systematize and critique
the trends in the previous category.
2.1 Algorithmic Attacks and Defenses
Machine learning models have long been studied as subjects of adversarial pressure [Dalvi et al.,
2004, Lowd and Meek, 2005a,b]. This paper concentrates on deep learning models since the im-
portant advances they enable in computer vision, natural language processing, and other fields are
being widely deployed in real systems facing adversarial pressure. The academic study of “adver-
sarial examples” against neural networks traces its origin to Szegedy et al. [2013], which observed
that minor perturbations to the inputs of vision models can shift their outputs in unexpectedly ma-
jor ways. Since then, many researchers have found new ways to generate adversarial inputs and
make models resistant to such blind spots. Most notably, Carlini and Wagner [2017b] developed a
gradient-based optimization method that defeated state-of-the-art defenses proposed at the time and
has served as the basis for developing many attack algorithms. This led to the establishment of a
“standard” threat model for neural networks that is widely deployed in the ML literature. Namely,
most research considers a network to be “robust” if it can be guaranteed – empirically or theoreti-
cally – that a certain percentage of adversarially modified test set members are correctly classified.
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These adversarial modifications must be within an ǫ distance (usually an ℓp norm of some sort) of
the original, clean examples. This metric is known as robust accuracy. Within the bounds of this
model, promising approaches to making neural networks more robust have been proposed, such as
Madry et al. [2017], Lecuyer et al. [2019], and Wong and Kolter [2017].
Nevertheless, it remains unclear how this threat model applies in real deployments of vision models
or to ML models used in other domains. Some research moves closer to answering this question.
Sharif et al. [2016] demonstrate that physical objects (e.g., glasses frames) can be designed adver-
sarially to mislead face recognition models; Eykholt et al. [2018] show that adversarially crafted
stickers can cause errors in road sign and image recognition models; and Cao et al. [2019] demon-
strate that depth-based networks operating on LiDAR data are also vulnerable. Beyond images,
Carlini and Wagner [2018] craft adversarial sounds that mislead speech transcription models, and
Gleave et al. [2019] show that even the input state space of reinforcement learning algorithms can
be adversarially modified to tamper with their operation.
All this work illuminates what is possible under different assumptions of adversarial power and has
produced fundamental advances that take us closer to secure models. We offer a new perspective
based on our experience evaluating the security of deployed end-to-end systems incorporating deep
learning. We find that generating adversarial examples is not the only method available to attackers.
In fact, much more unsophisticated attacks are currently more probable and just as hard to defend
against. This realization poses both new challenges that have not yet been considered in the literature
and presents under-researched opportunities to reason about security at the system level.
2.2 Security and Machine Learning
In another category of related work, researchers have stepped back to evaluate the threat models and
assumptions of the attacks and defense literature. Before the emergence of deep learning models
and adversarial examples, Barreno et al. [2010] studied how machine learning and security interact.
Papernot et al. [2018] first systemized the literature on security and privacy as it relates to deep
learning. This was later extended by Papernot [2018], who applied the 10 security principles of
Saltzer and Schroeder [1975] to highlight how machine learning violates them. While some of our
findings overlap, we observe a new set of challenges that have not yet been discussed.
One work that takes a similar approach to ours but applies principles of software engineering in-
stead of security is Sculley et al. [2014]. The authors observe that ML violates typical notions of
software isolation, introduces costly data dependencies, and encourages the creation of “spaghetti”
code. Some of these observations also apply to the security of machine learning systems, as we
highlight below.
Finally, Gilmer et al. [2018] consider what the correct threat model for studying adversarial exam-
ples should be. The authors critique the “perturbation literature” – the set of works studying attacks
and defenses bounded by Lp norms – and find that most motivating scenarios for this work do
not apply directly to the setting that is being studied. They find that no realistic scenario requires
imperceptible adversarial examples and that less sophisticated attacks exist for many others. Our
experience with evaluating the security of a deployed system incorporating deep neural networks
confirms this observation. Adversarial inputs are not limited to adversarial examples. The chal-
lenges we highlight are not limited to adversarial patches, and the solutions we suggest apply more
broadly. We concretize solutions and expand on them in greater detail than Gilmer et al. [2018].
3 Adversarial Machine Learning Through the Lens of Systems Security
We propose focusing the design of robust real-world ML using systems security questions. While
not a perfect success story, systems security research has managed to decrease the risk of threats to
traditional software using a robust toolbox of security best practices. Based on our direct experiences
with our industry’s ML systems at scale, two “first principles” considerations from systems security
can aid us in adding a new focus to adversarial machine learning research:
Threat modeling The first step to increasing the security of any system is developing a threat
model and AI systems are no exception. While there is no single unified approach to threat modeling
and risk management in the computer security field, the process often involves carefully thinking
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through who might want to abuse the system, what capabilities they have, how they might be able to
do it, and what the overall risk of the exploit is. This process informs designers and engineers where
defense efforts should be focused and what compromises can be anticipated. In the discussion that
follows, we consider how threat modeling machine learning systems can be better informed.
Work factor analysis The goal of systems security is in most cases, not to perfectly secure the
system, as this is usually impossible. Rather, it is to introduce as many barriers to an adversary
as possible. If the resources necessary to attack the system become sufficiently high, it becomes
disadvantageous for the adversary to attempt to exploit any weaknesses in the system. In the seminal
paper of Saltzer and Schroeder [1975], this is codified as the principle of work factor. Similarly,
when designing defenses for robust machine learning, the goal should be to make it as costly as
possible for an attacker to maliciously change the behavior of our system, with any attack. More
specifically, ML systems should be designed so that attackers must commit a disproportionately
large effort to overcome a small defensive effort. This perspective borrowed from systems security
yields a number of concrete suggestions to designers of secure ML systems.
In the remainder of this section, we describe the implications of threat modeling and work factor
analysis on robust ML and short-term mitigations.
3.1 End-to-end ML Security
A machine learning model’s interaction with other components in deployed systems can be ex-
tremely complex. This increases the potential for subtle security flaws but also presents additional
possible barriers to adversaries. We propose focusing more attention on these two issues.
First, threat models should consider system-level interactions. Most existing studies of attacks on
machine learning consider a single model in isolation and demonstrate that its inputs can be manip-
ulated to shift its predictions according to an adversary’s goal. But when a model is part of a bigger
system, a multitude of additional security issues present themselves. In developing attacks with full
access to the systems in our organization, we found that vulnerabilities were often caused by how
programmed logic combined outputs of multiple ML models. These errors are not fixed by simply
improving the accuracy of each of the component models. As a concrete example of one issue that
we observed, models often act on outputs of other models. If one of them fails to stop the process-
ing of invalid inputs, downstream models will be acting on data outside of their valid operational
region. If the inputs are adversarial, this leads to a full system compromise. If inputs are merely
out-of-distributions, downstream models and code start behaving in undefined ways. This exposes
information about the system and aids adversaries in their search for adversarial inputs. Therefore,
a threat model should consider how a failure in one component leads to cascading failures of the
system overall.
Second, a work factor analysis of system-level defenses can help to ensure secure behavior even
when an individual model may be vulnerable to adversarial examples or other adversarial inputs.
Our full-access explorations revealed that adversaries seldom succeed on their first attempt to com-
promise a system. This was true even when they possessed thorough knowledge of every software
component and the model’s architecture, parameters, and configuration. This suggests that systems
should stop feeding inputs to machine learning models and revealing their responses early on when
multiple “wrong” inputs are received. One work that implements such a solution for public cloud-
based machine learning APIs is [Chen et al., 2019]. In it, the authors suggest developing a mecha-
nism to detect and block queries meant to estimate the gradient of the model for an attack that only
has query access. We believe more research of this nature is needed. It needs to explore both the
specific needs and capabilities of other systems (through careful context-specific threat modeling)
and how the adversary’s work factor scales when such “lockout” defenses are introduced.
3.2 Robust Input Modalities
Another fruitful approach we observed for increasing the security of machine learning models is to
generate their inputs in a robust manner that increases the work factor for attacks. While this does
not prevent all possible adversarial examples, attackers need to expend many more resources to find
adversarial inputs for robust input modalities.
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First consider cloud machine learning services where adversaries have the ability to directly alter the
pixels that are fed to a computer vision model. This capability allows the attacker to outright replace
the image with one that does not correspond to the world that is being observed and trivially enables
serious compromises. However, in a lot of the systems we observed, adversaries do not have that
kind of access and they need to either find ways to project fake objects (as in [Nassi et al., 2019])
or be more subtle and create physical adversarial objects (as in [Sharif et al., 2016, Eykholt et al.,
2018, Brown et al., 2017]). The relative increase in work factor for attackers is large, even though
attacks are still possible. Projections need specific configurations in order to succeed or expensive
equipment. Adversarial patches require sophisticated knowledge of both machine learning and the
model’s internals and parameters. Both of these are much more costly than replacing the raw image
input. This line of thought extends further. Work on physical adversarial examples in 3D-based
vision systems, such as [Cao et al., 2019], demonstrates the existence of objects that mislead depth-
based vision. However, the objects are both more conspicuous and harder to manufacture. Creating
them may not be worth the effort for the adversary’s payoffs. Therefore, we suggest that threat
models for AI systems should take into account what the attacker stands to gain from an exploit
relative to the resources they need to spend to achieve that goal.
In the course of our experiments with vision systems in particular, we observed that physical adver-
sarial examples exhibit temporal instability. When the input to the system is video, the predictions
of the neural network model exhibit high variance across frames. In some, the predictions are very
close to the adversary’s goal. In others, the adversarial property is lost and the adversary’s goal is far
from being achieved. Therefore, to robustify any systems with video input modality in particular, we
suggest using temporal inconsistency as a possible signal of an attack in progress. More generally,
combining multiple orthogonal input modalities is likely to increase the effort required to synthesize
an adversarial input, and increase the computational burden of the attack as well. A key research
direction is to better understand these costs and the trade-offs between the added burden to the ML
developer and system versus the added burden for the attacker.
3.3 Adaptive Defenses for Adaptive Adversaries
Some of the most important advances in ML have been driven by common tasks, datasets, and
benchmarks. As long as a model exists that can achieve a good enough benchmark on a given data
set, we consider the problem solved. This has been very useful in core machine learning research
and allows us to track and compare progress over time. It has been so useful that the problem of
securing machine learning is often cast as a problem of achieving some level of “robust accuracy.”
To that end, researchers run competitions [Kurakin et al., 2018] where attackers are rewarded for
reducing robust accuracy and defenders get points for keeping it high.
There are two problems in applying this approach to developing secureML systems. First, achieving
success through a high performance on a benchmark corresponds to a static threat model, in which
the capabilities of the attacker are always fixed. This problem is clearly evidenced by the fact
that defenses with high robust accuracy scores have been consistently defeated by adversaries with
knowledge of the defense mechanism, as described in [Carlini and Wagner, 2017b,a, Athalye et al.,
2018, Tramer et al., 2020]. Second, robust accuracy in the face of adversarial examples does not
capture the full set of adversarial capabilities available to compromise a model. Attackers can find
out-of-distribution inputs that do not fit in with the inputs that the model designer imagined. For
example, Nassi et al. [2019] demonstrates an attack that fools an autonomous vehicle into stopping
or veering out of its lane by simply projecting false images of stop signs, pedestrians, and lane
markers onto and around a road. Sufficiently realistic projections of light onto the road are enough to
cause the vehicle to violate its security guarantees. This can often be fixed when a model is retrained
with such novel examples or if a dedicated model is developed to reject them. But adversaries adapt,
leading to a whack-a-mole of trying to capture the distribution of ever-changing adversarial inputs.
Indeed, we are not the first to recognize this issue. Brown et al. [2018] are running a competition
with adaptive adversaries and defenses that focuses on “unrestricted adversarial examples”—any im-
age where some unambiguous ground truth diverges from the model’s high-confidence predictions.
This is a good first step in how the community responds to these threats and we encourage more
research in this space so that blind spots in popular models can be thoroughly explored. An impor-
tant research challenge is the automation of such exploration. Threat modeling ℓp-norm adversarial
examples has been made much easier by a well-studied set of algorithms for generating them. We
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challenge the community to explore how new methods, such as simulations or game theory, might
help in programmatic exploration and reasoning about adaptive adversarial inputs.
4 Retooling Systems Security for Adversarial Machine Learning
Securing machine learning is a challenging endeavor for two reasons. First, ML is fundamentally
solving a statistical task. This introduces inherent uncertainty into the input/output behavior of any
non-trivial algorithm. This makes it hard for a defender to have high confidence in evaluating the
behavior of ML solutions; is the algorithm simply encountering novel, but real, phenomena, or is
it being attacked? Second, current ML models are very complex and their behaviors are often hard
to interpret. This lack of insight into their inner workings makes it hard to control these models,
resulting in potentially adversarial phenomena like adversarial perturbations.
These challenges are in many ways not unique to ML. Modern systems security research deals
with subtle, non-deterministic bugs and large, hard-to-interpret code bases as well. Because the
challenges are similar, we believe the goal of secure ML can be helped by an expansion of the focus
of systems security research. In this section, we describe 4 security best practices, what worked well
in applying them for ML systems, and where more research is needed to ensure they function well
for ML models. We do not claim to be exhaustive, but the areas we describe below improved the
security of ML systems in our explorations.
4.1 Sanitization of Inputs
Input sanitization is an important security best practice that identifies invalid inputs that may cause
security issues and ensures they are either not processed or stripped of elements that may trigger a
flaw. For instance, in programming languages that allow direct modification of memory, program-
mers add checks for inputs that may overflow available buffers and reject them if necessary. In web
applications, form input is stripped of certain characters before being fed into the database engine
in order to prevent SQL injection attacks. Systems with machine learning components should apply
similar techniques. For example, an autonomous vehicle vision module should not consider painted,
printed, or projected images of road signs as real objects to be classified. For a secure voice com-
mand system, a synthesized or recorded voice should be rejected before commands are acted upon.
Similarly, adversarial inputs that are deliberately created to mislead neural networks (e.g., adversar-
ial stickers or patches like the toaster patch from Brown et al. [2017]) should be considered invalid
inputs. Thus, in a real system, processing of these kinds of inputs should be stopped or ignored in
order to ensure secure execution.
Unfortunately, solutions to this challenge have received less attention in the research literature. As
a result, we found that methods for ensuring only valid inputs reach machine learning models are
less robust and more ad-hoc than the models themselves. A key challenge is that input validity itself
is ill-defined for many systems and applications. For many use cases, no simple heuristics exist to
reject invalid inputs, or to identify safe behavior or response in the face of an invalid input.
Even when input validity is well-defined, ML models for sanitizing inputs are brittle and unreliable.
This is partially a problem of datasets. Consider computer vision. Large, labeled datasets exist for a
diverse set of tasks, such as image classification and object detection. However, none of these labels
printed or projected objects distinctly from “naturally occurring” ones. Thus, it is to be expected
that object detectors detect both printed and projected objects as well as real ones. Similarly, in
audio transcription, the benchmark dataset for detecting spoofed recordings contains only 18,000
utterances [Kinnunen et al., 2017], as compared to over 65,000 utterances in the transcription task
dataset [Warden, 2018]. This indicates that datasets with adversarial inputs may be too small to solve
the task well with any model. Adversaries can draw on a much larger space of possibly adversarial
inputs than those that are captured in the data. To remedy this, we call for the creation of larger and
more diverse input sanitization datasets that are continuously updated with new adversarial behavior.
However, even if good datasets existed, the models trained on them are also likely to be vulnerable
to adversarial examples. Thus, we believe more research is needed in this area. A primary ques-
tion to answer is whether adversarial examples and adversarial physical objects can be created that
fool sanitization models as well. More importantly, research should seek to understand if one can
generate inputs that are adversarial to both kinds of models at the same time. A related question is
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whether more models working together increases the adversary’s work factor. Finally, an alternative
approach to input sanitization is anomaly detection and outlier rejection. It is currently unknown
which approach is likely to yield better, more generalizable results and we believe research should
work to address this gap of knowledge.
4.2 Evaluating and Testing for Security
A well-agreed security principle is that the designers of a system should not be solely responsible for
its security evaluation. Independent review serves to catch vulnerabilities that designers would have
missed otherwise. There are two schools of thought on who should aid them in doing so. Regardless
of the position one takes on this, systems security for ML needs better solutions for both.
On the one hand, many security experts believe that details of the system internals should be made
available publicly to allow for better scrutiny. This not only allows for more people to look at the
design and implementation and look for security flaws but also forces designers to create software
that is secure even if those details are known to the attacker. Since even the most well-guarded
secrets leak, it is believed that this makes more secure software overall. Unfortunately, releasing
a model’s architecture and parameters enables strictly stronger attacks in the ML world. This is
due to the fact that backpropagating through a neural network (when adversaries possess its weights
and structure) remains the most efficient way to generate adversarial examples for it. Query-access
methods generally take many more queries, as the gradient function needs to be approximated and
cannot be analytically computed. This is also born out by our observation that designers of ML
systems prefer to rely on obfuscating the design of their system. We believe more research is needed
on how end-to-end ML systems should be designed so that they are secure even if the ML model
and other details of it become public.
On the other hand, not all secure systems are public. Private auditing and internal testing serve
to discover and remedy flaws in those cases. This is generally aided by good software engineering
practices that isolate functionality and make individual components easy to interpret. However, even
the smallest unit of functionality in ML systems — the model itself — is often very complex. Thus,
it is difficult to reason about corner cases of isolated components and test for them explicitly. Early
research has already appeared on how this can be achieved programmatically. For example, Pei et al.
[2017], developed a framework for automated testing guided by “neuron coverage,” a concept stem-
ming from software code coverage. Indeed, many works have followed in this paper’s footsteps.
Without claiming to be exhaustive, we highlight works such as [Ma et al., 2018, Wang et al., 2018,
Odena and Goodfellow, 2018] and encourage further research in this area.
4.3 Updates
No system is perfectly secure and vulnerabilities are often discovered well after software is first
released to users. The classical recommendation to deal with this issue in systems security is to allow
for continuous updating. This allows engineers to release patches as soon as a fix is available and
prevents exploitable vulnerabilities from languishing in deployed software. Certainly, ML models
often need updating as well. They operate on phenomena that may exhibit distributional shift. New
situations may arise that the model has not seen, leading to degraded performance and raising the
risk of exploits due to unanticipated behavior. In other cases, developers might learn that certain
classes of inputs cause the model to fail consistently (such as projected images on the road for
object detection). In those situations, it is highly desirable for engineers to release new versions of
the model trained on updated data or that are otherwise more secure.
However, ML models often introduce system dependencies that make such updating difficult. We
observed particularly troublesome cases in pipelined settings where the code processing the outputs
of the model expects them to be distributed in specific ways. As a concrete example, systems
that process stored data generated by machine learning models need to keep old versions of models
running in parallel to newer ones until enough data processed by the new version has been generated.
Adapting the code is also not an option until enough new data exists. This slows down the update
cycle and prevents engineers from issuing “hot” patches to remedy newly discovered security issues.
Therefore, exploitable security vulnerabilities in machine learning systems due to the model often
persist for long periods of time.
One concrete suggestion is to decouple the classification task that the model performs from the task
of securing input to it. Techniques such as adversarial training attempt to directly robustify the
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classification model itself. We found that keeping the model itself unchanged, but guarding it with a
set of defense algorithms is a more scalable and adaptive solution. This allows for faster deployment
of “hot” patches when new attacks are found.
A more thorough discussion of these issues from the perspective of software engineering is available
in [Sculley et al., 2014] but we highlight the problems with updates that we observed in the security
setting. We urge the research community to consider the issue of updating models so that they can
output data that conforms to a standard specification. Any solutions should allow developers to
release new models that are backwards compatible with previously stored outputs. However, as in
all cases of backward compatibility, such research needs to balance future performance and security
with conforming to the old standard.
4.4 Sharing Knowledge of Vulnerabilities
Because machine learning models are needed to let systems process real-world phenomena, it is
nearly impossible to predict a-priori all the ways in which the distributions for certain tasks can
shift. Motivated adversaries are likely to keep discovering ways of violating the assumptions of the
training set and the system more broadly. Thus, system designers should be ready to handle failure
cases as they arise. That is why we propose that the community establish a common database of
failure modes. If practitioners share with each other where models have failed and provide exam-
ples, then they can collaborate in covering a large search space of potential security holes. Indeed,
this concept is not new; the CVE database of public security vulnerabilities in classic software
(https://cve.mitre.org) has long served as a centralized repository of known exploits that de-
velopers can reference to secure their own code and anticipate threats.
We believe that the machine learning community can benefit from a similar database. For example,
all researchers and practitioners studying object detection can submit videos where important ob-
jects are missed or where spurious objects are detected. If this database is made public and labels
are provided in standardized formats, everybody applying detectors to their problem can use the data
directly to fit a better function that reduces false positives and false negatives. But even the experi-
ence of observing new classes of failure cases can prod systems designers to remedy problems in
their vision pipeline. Each practitioner can go out and collect extra data to augment their model or
they could build in heuristics to better handle inputs with the newly observed failures. In either case,
such a public database would help defenders by reducing the number of “unknown unknwons” that
designers have to deal with in favor of “known unknowns.”
5 Discussion and Conclusions
Machine learning introduces novel challenges to securing computer systems. Not only are models
applied in statistical settings where it is hard to anticipate adversarial input, but even the most so-
phisticated models contain vulnerabilities that we do not know how to remedy yet. We argue that
these deficiencies can be filled by learning from experiences with deployed systems using ML and
carefully reasoning through how closely they follow classical security best practices. This requires
two advances. On the one hand, machine learning needs to adapt to consider full systems and the
real threats they are likely to face in an adaptive setting. On the other, technological solutions for
applying systems security best practices in ML systems need to be developed.
In order to remedy acute threats against deployed systems, machine learning practitioners should
consider these approaches:
• Threat model for adaptive adversaries who possess knowledge of your defenses.
• Consider how exploits in ML translate to exploits of the overall system and examine whether the
programming logic advantages attackers in adversarial settings.
• Increase the cost of an attack by introducing multiple models that sanity-check each other.
• Introduce robust input modalities where adversarial inputs are inherently more costly.
However, these mitigations are only likely to last so long. In order to move the field of secure
ML forward, we call on researchers to provide solutions to the following problems plaguing real
systems:
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• Provide mechanisms for rejecting invalid and outright adversarial inputs so that machine learning
models do not process those and enable exploits.
• Develop methods to easily examine machine learning models for security pitfalls in testing.
• Propose models that can safely be released publicly and do not increase the adversary’s capabili-
ties at a disproportionate cost to the benefit from open access
• Study update mechanisms that preserve “good” functionality and the distribution of outputs so
that vulnerable machine learning models can be quickly updated.
• Compile a standardized database of common failure cases that ML practitioners can benefit from
in designing their systems around known vulnerabilities.
We are optimistic that these changes can allow us to make better and more reliable use of the impres-
sive functionality enabled by machine learning today.
Broader Impact
The work presented here is intended to benefit designers of ML systems, researchers who study
issues around security and AI, and – ultimately – end users who should benefit from more secure
and reliable software. Unfortunately, ML is not strictly used for “good” and where these principles
might aid in securing systems with benign functionality, they might also make it hard to develop
defenses against malign ML systems (such as face recognition for illegitimate surveillance) if they
are robustified in these ways. However, we believe that increasing the security of software is a goal
in and of itself and will ultimately have many more benefits than harms. We do not believe that
issues of bias in datasets apply, as we do not use any datasets in this work.
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